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INTRODUcTION
The current economic environment is ripe with dissatisfaction.
Investors are disappointed with the performance of the stock
exchanges and are skeptical of the advice offered by brokers and
their associates.' The bankruptcy of Enron and the subsequently
revealed accounting scandals have exacerbated the apprehension
and distaste investors currently feel for management.2 These
scandals have focused not only the attention of investors but also
that of regulatory agencies on firms' compliance with regulations.
The attention is sure to result in increased litigation and
investigation in both the private and public sectors regarding
compliance supervisory systems implemented by the various
corporations? Among the targets will almost certainly be the legal
compliance director of the broker-dealer firm, to whom the firm
usually delegates the responsibility of investigating and preventing
violations.4
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1. See Gretchen Morgensen, Economy Is Surging, but Wall Street Is Down
in the Dumps, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2002, at Al (noting that consumers remain
uneasy over "corporate profits and investigations into Wall Street practices");
Jitters About Corporate Accounting Push Down Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2002, at C12.
2- See Jitters About Corporate Accounting Push Down Shares, supra note 1.
3. See Linda Stern, The Claims Games, NEWSWEEK, May 7, 2001, at 77
(stating that aggrieved customers are filing a new case every 20 minutes at the
National Association of Securities Dealers dispute resolution office).
4. Id.
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The role of the compliance director is a product of the
securities laws passed by Congress in the early 1930s5 and the rules
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"
or "Commission"). Congress inserted provisions in the securities
laws that required broker-dealers to supervise their subordinates.6
Specifically, § 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934
Act") permitted the sanctioning of a broker-dealer who
inadequately supervised the firm's employees.7 Section 15 of the
1934 Act also permitted sanctions against authorized agents of
broker-dealers for the agents' failure to supervise.! Congress
included these provisions to initiate in-firm mechanisms ensuring
the compliance of brokerages with the securities laws.9
In fulfilling this mandate, brokerages have created
departments dedicated to analyzing the securities laws and
investigating the internal workings of the brokers' offices to assess
whether the employees and procedures comply with the securities
laws. ° As the importance of these departments increase in the
wake of accounting and reporting scandals, the directors of such
departments shoulder a greater burden. This increased burden and
responsibility seems to place them at greater risk for SEC
enforcement actions and private litigation.
This Note discusses the requirements of the supervisory
mandate of the federal securities regulations and the liability
imposed on brokerage compliance directors through the courts and
the administrative process. In addition, this Note addresses some
contradictions and concerns apparent in the multiple roles often
assumed by compliance directors. Part I discusses the current
regulatory scheme regarding supervisory structures elaborated by
the SEC. Part II discusses the sanctions the SEC can impose on
those who breach their duty to supervise. Part III sets forth
particular considerations relevant when an attorney or other
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (1990); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-3, 78o (1990).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1990).
7. Id.
& See id.
9. See id. (stating the sanctions must be applied with a "view to preventing
violations of such statutory provisions, rules, and regulations.... ").
10. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of
Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 71, 72 (2002).
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professional is serving as the compliance director or compliance
department staff member. Finally, Part IV attempts to distill a
satisfactory supervisory structure from the SEC cases that will
allow the brokerages and the compliance director to avoid liability.
I. SUPERVISORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASELAW
Broker-dealer firms often attempt to satisfy their regulatory
duty of supervision by creating compliance departments." The
departments are staffed with individuals who analyze the
supervisory structure of the firm, investigate alleged violations by
employees, and draft recommendations on the path the firm should
follow to comply with the federally imposed mandates. The
compliance department is sometimes staffed with attorneys,
accountants, or other professionals, 3 which brings up additional
considerations that will be addressed later in this Note.
Compliance directors and department staff are often included
in administrative proceedings before the SEC because of their role
in ensuring compliance with the securities laws. 4 In most cases, the
Division of Enforcement ("Division"), the body that acts as
prosecutor in SEC administrative actions, alleges that the
compliance officer or director failed to adequately supervise the
firm's employees. 5 However, for liability to issue, the compliance
officer must inhabit a supervisory role within the framework of the
corporate structure. 6 This finding is necessary because inherent in
a supervisory role is the duty to reasonably oversee the
subordinate and ensure the subordinates' compliance with the
securities laws." After proving that the respondent is a supervisor,
the Division must then prove that the brokerage house and the
supervisor failed to manage the subordinate in a manner
11. Id.
12- Id.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1990).
17. Id.
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reasonably expected to prevent violations of the securities laws.'"
A. The Evolving Standard of Compliance Directors and Personnel
As Supervisors Within the Meaning of .§ 15(b)(4)
Before the Division of Enforcement will succeed in its failure-
to-supervise claim, the Division must show that the compliance
officer was a supervisor of the individual who violated the
securities laws. 9 Compliance personnel do not become supervisors
merely because they occupy positions in the compliance
department.0 Instead, the determination of whether a compliance
director can be labeled a supervisor for purposes of §§ 15(b)(4)(E)
and 15(b)(6) is quite factual and rests on the particularities of each21
case. The Commission has elaborated on a framework that can
assist in assessing whether the compliance director was in a
supervisory position vis-A-vis the offender."
Traditionally, the Commission has used the "line" approach to
determine supervisor status.' Using this approach in In re Arthur
James Huff, the Commission considered whether the alleged
supervisor was in the same supervisory structure as the violator."
In other words, the Commission determined whether the individual
was in the violator's direct supervisory chain in the hierarchical
scheme of the firm.' Thus, the Commission found that Huff was a
line supervisor within the meaning of § 15(b)(4).26
Two commissioners in Huff proposed an expanded definition
of supervision in a concurring opinion.' The concurrence stated
18. See id.
19. See In re Arthur James Huff, Exchange Act Release No. 29,017, 48 S.E.C.
Docket 767, at *7 (Mar. 28, 1991).
20. See In re John H. Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31,554, 51 S.E.C.
93, 113 (Dec. 3, 1992).
21. Id. (analyzing the specifics of the relationship between the "supervisors"
and their subordinates).
22. Id.
23. See In re George J. Kolar, Initial Decisions Release No. 152, 70 S.E.C.
Docket 2382, at *28 (Oct. 28, 1999) (citing Huff, 48 S.E.C. Docket 767, at *7).
24. Huff, 48 S.E.C. Docket 767, at *7.
25. Id.
26. Id. at *3.
27. Id. at *7.
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that the ability to control the conduct of the other individual was
the most important consideration in determining who was a
supervisor under § 15(b)(4). 28 Without the requisite control, the
concurrence argued, supervision would not exist.29
The concurrence distilled this new method of analysis from the
few cases where the Commission held non-line supervisors liable
for failing to supervise the violator.3" In Check, the Commission
had imposed liability on a non-line supervisor because of Check's
unique position to exercise supervisory control.3 In In re Michael
Tannenbaum, the Commission had held a non-line supervisor
liable because he had sole authority to permit subordinates to
engage in a particular transaction. 2 The concurrence in Huff used
these two cases to illustrate that control was the true essence of the
line approach and, therefore, the appropriate consideration."
Commissioners Lochner and Schapiro further concluded that the
statutory language of § 15(b)(4) and the common meaning of
supervision substantiated this interpretation.
34
Arguably, this more generally applicable definition of
"supervisor" would allow the Division to go after compliance
directors who were not line supervisors. This control analysis was
used in Gutfreund, where the Commission instituted proceedings
against several senior executives of Salomon Brothers, Inc.
("Salomon Brothers"). 5 John H. Gutfreund, Thomas W. Strauss,
John W. Meriwether and Donald M. Feuerstein were high-level
executives of Salomon Brothers?6 The Division alleged that these
four executives failed to supervise Paul Mozer, an employee in the
28. Id. (stating that "In our view, the most probative factor that would
indicate whether a person is responsible for the actions of another is whether that
person has the power to control the other's conduct.").
29. Id.
30. Id. at *8.
31. In re Robert J. Check, Exchange Act Release No. 26,367, 42 S.E.C.
Docket 760, at *4 (Dec. 16, 1988).
32. In re Michael E. Tennenbaum, Exchange Act Release No. 18,429, [1981-
82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,092 (Jan. 19, 1982).
33. Huff, 48 S.E.C. Docket 767, at *7.
34. Id.
35. In re John H. Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31,554, 51 S.E.C. 93,
113 (Dec. 3, 1992).
36. Id. at 94-95.
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firm's Government Trading department." Paul Mozer ("Mozer")
was the head of the Government Trading department and had
submitted numerous false bids and traded in clients' accounts
without authorization:" The Division claimed that the four
individuals oversaw Mozer in a supervisory capacity and therefore
were required to reasonably ensure that Mozer complied with the
securities laws.39
Of particular note was the Commission's analysis of
Feuerstein's supervisory role.4 ' Donald Feuerstein was the firm's
chief legal officer and oversaw the compliance department of
Salomon Brothers.4 In this role, he was not a line supervisor of
Mozer." Using the traditional definition, the Commission may not
have been able to impose sanctions on Feuerstein. However, the
Commission stated that the requisite analysis of whether an
individual is a supervisor considers whether the person had the
"responsibility, ability, or authority to affect the conduct of the
employee whose behavior is at issue."43 Thus, instead of remaining
with the rigid line/non-line distinction, the Commission moved to
the more flexible test that used control as the determining factor."
Using this analysis, the Commission found that Feuerstein
exercised the requisite control over Mozer and was his supervisor
for purposes of § 15(b)(4)." Specifically, the opinion noted that
Feuerstein was the firm's chief legal officer and controlled the
37. Id. at 95.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 108.
40. Id. at 112-14.
41. Id.
42 Id. at 112.
43. Id. at 113.
44. Id. (stating that a "person's actual responsibilities and authority, rather
than, for example, his or her line or non-line status, will determine whether he or
she is a supervisor.").
45. Id. at 113 (stating that Feuerstein shared the responsibility for Mozer
because of Feuerstein's "role and influence within the firm... and the factual
circumstances of this case. Under those circumstances, we believe that such a
person becomes a "supervisor" for purposes of Sections 15(b)(4)(E) and
15(b)(6). As a result, that person is responsible, along with the other supervisors,
for taking reasonable and appropriate action.").
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compliance department. 6 The firm had placed Feuerstein in a
position of power concerning Mozer and the firm relied on
Feuerstein to recommend action."7 Moreover, the Commission
noted that Feuerstein had taken the lead role in other instances of
alleged misconduct and had disciplined other violators. 8
Therefore, Feuerstein held a powerful position within the firm and
could affect Mozer's conduct.49
This new analysis was affirmed in Lysiak, a case adjudicated
by the Commission subsequent to the issuance of the settlement
order in Gutfreund.' In Lysiak, the Commission stated that the
Gutfreund criteria accurately reflected its opinion regarding the
matter." However, the Commission's clearly stated position in its
settlement order and report of investigation in Gutfreund was
challenged in a subsequent case.
In In re George J. Kolar, the respondent argued that the
Gutfreund analysis was not applicable because Gutfreund was a
settlement order, not a litigated case. 2 In making this ultra vires
objection, the respondent argued that the Division is able to obtain
greater sanctions and incorrectly expand its reach through
settlement proceedings, while the actual powers granted to the
SEC are not as broad. 3 The Division would not have been able to
obtain such sanctions if not for the fact that the respondent had
settled the case." Therefore, the respondent argued, Gutfreund
46. Id. at 112.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. In re Conrad C. Lysiak, Exchange Act Release No. 33,245, 51 S.E.C. 841,
844 n.13 (Nov. 24, 1993), affid, 47 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 1995).
51. Id.
52. In re George J. Kolar, Initial Decisions Release No. 152, 70 S.E.C.
Docket 2382, at *26 (Oct. 28, 1999).
53. Id.
54. See Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange
Commission: The Lawyer As Prosecutor, 61 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBs. 33, 42
(1998) (criticizing "frequent use of settlements to announce Commission policy in
borderline cases" and "use of leverage by the SEC to settle novel cases" in which
it is unclear or doubtful that a court would uphold the Commission's legal
theory); Norman S. Johnson & Ross A. Albert, D~jd Vu All Over Again: The
Securities and Exchange Commission Once More Attempts to Regulate the
2003]
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could not be used as precedent.5
In response to the respondent's claims, Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ") James T. Kelly noted that a settlement order by the
SEC is usually accompanied by an opinion and finding of fact.56
These orders are issued after an extensive review by the
Commission and are as authoritative as opinions in contested
cases.7 The ALJ acknowledged that the order issued in Gutfreund
was accompanied by an investigatory report, which lessened its
authority. However, ALJ Kelly noted that the Gutfreund
decision, along with the subsequent use of the new standard in
Lysiak, was sufficient to form a basis to use the new analysis of
supervision. 9 Having settled this question, ALJ Kelly found that
Mr. Kolar was the violator's supervisor and could affect the
violator's actions.' ALJ Kelly further found that Mr. Kolar had
failed to reasonably supervise Mr. Turner, the violator, by not
investigating red flags and allegations of impropriety.61 Therefore,
Mr. Kolar was liable for the breach of his duty to supervise.62
In an administrative action concerning Louis R. Trujillo, the
SEC held that the standard for determining whether a compliance
officer was deficient in his duties is "reasonable supervision under
the attendant circumstances."63 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. ("Merrill Lynch") employed Louis R. Trujillo
("Trujillo") as a supervisor in its San Francisco office. His
Accounting Profession Through Rule 102(e) of Its Rules of Practice, 1999 UTAH
L. REv. 553, 579 (1999).
55. In re George J. Kolar, Initial Decisions Release No. 152, 70 S.E.C.
Docket 2382, at *26 (Oct. 28, 1999).
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing In re Carl L. Shipley, Investment Advisors Act Release No.
419, 45 S.E.C. 589, 591-92 n.6 (June 21, 1974)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Kolar, 70 S.E.C. Docket 2382, at *28 (stating that Mr. Kolar was
considered a full supervisor despite his inability to unilaterally hire and fire an
individual).
61. Id. at *29.
62. ld. at *32-*34 (imposing a six month suspension on Mr. Kolar).
63. In re Louis R. Trujillo, Exchange Act Release No. 26,635, 1989 SEC
LEXIS 480, *10 (Mar. 16, 1989).
64. Id. at *1-*2.
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position involved various compliance and administrative duties,
including the review of client complaints and new accounts.65 The
Division of Enforcement commenced an administrative action
against Trujillo, alleging that he had failed to supervise salesperson
Victor G. Matl ("Matl"), who had been found guilty of violating
the antifraud provision of the 1934 Act.6
The Division asserted that Trujillo had failed to adequately
supervise Matl, as required under §§ 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6) of
Exchange Act. In reviewing the complaint, the Commission
analyzed Trujillo's actions, or, more accurately, inaction, "under all
the circumstances. 68  The Commission considered the alleged
violations of Matl, the structure of the office, and the power
invested in Trujillo.6 9 The Commission restricted its investigation
to the information and circumstances available to Trujillo at the
time of the violation." Information and circumstances viewed in
hindsight must not affect the analysis.'
In finding Trujillo not guilty of failing to supervise Matl, the
72Commission emphasized Trujillo's lack of disciplinary power.
Trujillo was an administrative manager in Merrill Lynch's San
Francisco office and directly supervised Matl." However, Trujillo
reported to a supervisor himself." Trujillo was not given extensive
71power to regulate the actions of his subordinates. Instead, he was
merely the "'eyes and ears"' of the branch manger.7 His lack of
power to correct any violations or improper behavior ultimately
saved him from an administrative sanction.' The Commission, in
looking at all attendant circumstances, realized that Trujillo was
65. Id. at *3.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *9.
68. Id. at *10.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. In re Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., Initial Decisions Release No. 179, 74
S.E.C. Docket 522, at *49 (Jan. 22, 2001).
72. Trujillo, 1989 SEC LEXIS 480, at *9.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *11 (describing Trujillo's functions as "largely advisory").
75. Id.
76. Id. at *4.
77. See id.
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constrained by his position and did not act unreasonably."
Thus, determination of supervisory status is fact intensive.79
The inquiry considers whether the alleged supervisor could control
the actions of the subordinate." Although an individual may not
have been granted supervisory duties in the past, the circumstances
of the current situation might lead to a finding that the individual
was indeed a supervisor of the violator.' The determination of
whether an individual is a supervisor in the current instance rests
on the particularities of the relationship existing at that point.
The establishment of the compliance director as a supervisor
allows the Division to proceed in its case.82 The SEC has set forth
three additional elements that the Division of Enforcement must
prove to be successful in an action against a compliance officer for
failure to supervise." The Division must prove (1) the underlying
securities laws violations, (2) the affiliation of the violator with the
compliance officer and broker-dealer firm, and (3) a failure to
reasonably supervise the violator by the compliance officer.84 The
last prong tends to evoke the most controversy85 and will be
addressed in detail in the next section.
B. Reasonable Supervision and the Requirements of Qualifying for
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1990).
83. In re Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., Initial Decisions Release No. 179, 74
S.E.C. Docket 522, at *38 (Jan. 22, 2001) (citing Philadelphia Investors, Ltd.,
Initial Decisions Release No. 123, 66 S.E.C. Docket 2645, 2657 (Mar. 20, 1998)).
84. See Dean Witter, 74 S.E.C. Docket 522, at *38. The second and third
elements of the test elaborated by the SEC were not disputed in the Dean Witter
action. Id. After analyzing the first and fourth elements, ALJ Mahony found that
the supervisory structure established by Dean Witter was sufficient. Id. at *54.
Further, the ALJ reaffirmed the warning set forth by Commissioner Unger in
James Harvey Thornton, Exchange Act Release No. 41,007, 69 S.E.C. Docket 49,
58 (Feb. 1, 1999). Id. In his concurring opinion, Commissioner Unger stated that
the supervision must be assessed with the information available at the time of the
violations and not with information gleamed through hindsight. Thornton, 69
S.E.C. Docket at 58.
85. Dean Witter, 74 S.E.C. Docket 522, at *38.
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the Safe Harbor
The violation of securities laws by employees may result in
liability for the supervisor.6 However, § 15(b)(4) provides the firm
and the compliance director with a safe harbor. 7 If the firm or
brokerage house can prove that:
(1) there were in place "procedures, and a system for applying
such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to
prevent and detect" the securities violations in question, and
(2) the person responsible for administering such procedures
and system "reasonably discharged [his] duties and
obligations.., without reasonable cause to believe that such
procedures and system were not being complied with...88
then liability does not extend to the firm or the supervisor.89 Thus,
formation of a supervisory system reasonably believed to ensure
compliance with the securities laws is of utmost importance.
The securities laws themselves are not particularly instructive
on the type of supervisory compliance system sufficient to comply
with the safe-harbor provision. The SEC, however, has analyzed
many systems in its administrative adjudication of claims brought
by the SEC's Division of Enforcement." Through these
administrative proceedings, the SEC has elaborated on the
required supervisory systems and the standards that are applied in
evaluating these systems. 91
When analyzing failure-to-supervise cases, the Commission
tailors its investigation to whether the supervisory system in place
at the brokerage house was sufficient to reasonably prevent the
violations committed by the subordinates.92 The Commission does
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at *42 (quoting Exchange Act § 15(b)(4)(E), codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78o(b)(4)(E) (1990)).
89. Id.
90. See supra Part I.A.
91. See supra Part I.A.
92. In re Albert Vincent O'Neal, Exchange Act Release No. 34,116, 56 S.E.C.
Docket 2093, at *4 (May 26, 1994).
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not look at the ability of the supervisory structure to prevent all
securities violations.93 Instead, the reasonableness and efficacy of
the supervisory structure must be analyzed in light of the particular
violations at issue.
94
The Commission used this approach in In re Albert Vincent
O'Neal to bar Albert Vincent O'Neal ("O'Neal") from associating
with any broker or dealer for failing to supervise adequately four
sales representatives. 9 O'Neal was a branch manager of the Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. ("Dean Witter") office in Fort Worth,
Texas. 96 He was entrusted to supervise sales representatives in the
office and ensure their compliance with the securities laws and
Dean Witter policy.' In fact, he was considered the "front-line
compliance officer" of the Fort Worth office.98 However, four of
his subordinates had violated the securities laws while managing
customers' accounts. 99 The representatives had falsified options
agreement forms, engaged in unsuitable trading, churned the
customers' accounts, traded in unapproved options, and materially
misrepresented the safety of the trades to customers) °°
After analyzing O'Neal's actions regarding the four
representatives and the violations committed by them, the
Commission found that O'Neal was grossly deficient in his
supervisory and compliance duties.' °1 In the Commission's opinion,
O'Neal failed to see obvious suitability issues and disregarded
blatant violations by the representatives of Dean Witter policy.0"
O'Neal also failed to adequately review trading activity on
customers' accounts even after being warned of excessive trading
activity by lower level employees. 3 In all, the structure employed
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *1.
97. Id. at *3.
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id. at *1-*6.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *4-*6 (stating that O'Neal failed to contact customers to inquire
about a broker's alleged wrongdoing and refused to investigate red flags).
102. Id.
103. Id. at *3.
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by O'Neal at the branch office was not capable of preventing the
violations.'" O'Neal did not review accounts, respond to requests
for additional information from the main office or delegate
supervisory responsibilities to others."5 The Commission, finding
against O'Neal, barred him from the industry for one year and
from a proprietary or supervisory position for life."'6
In O'Neal, the Commission used a subjective, fact-intensive
test to analyze the firm's supervisory structure. In 1992, the
Commission put forth a more concrete rule, stating that
supervisory systems relying solely on the branch manager are not
sufficient. 7 This pronouncement came after an analysis of the
management structure created by Donald Sheldon.' Donald
Sheldon ("Sheldon") was the president of a registered broker-
dealer firm and an associated government securities firm.' 9 The
Division of Enforcement brought a proceeding against him
because Sheldon had not adequately delegated the supervisory
duties to subordinates and, therefore, retained the obligation to
ensure that the employees were complying with the securities
laws."'
The Commission found that Sheldon's employees were guilty
of selling inappropriate securities to individuals, excessively
marking-up securities, and misappropriating investors' money."' In
addition, the SEC held that Sheldon had failed to supervise his
employees and had not established a supervisory structure
sufficient to remove his liability."' Specifically, the Commission
found that Sheldon unreasonably relied on the branch managers
104. Id.
105. Id. at *4-*6.
106. Id. at *6.
107. In re Donald T. Sheldon, Exchange Act Release No. 31,475, 1992 SEC
LEXIS 3052 (Nov. 18, 1992).
108. Id.
109. Id. at *4.
110. Id. at *5 (stating that Sheldon increasingly ignored the violations that
were occurring within his firm).
111. Id. at *22-*30.
112. Id. (finding that Sheldon delegated supervisory duties to managers who
were unqualified and did not institute internal controls to guarantee that the
managers were fulfilling their responsibilities).
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while failing to ensure that they were carrying out their supervisory
duties."3 Furthermore, he failed to establish a training program to
ensure compliance."4
Even after the establishment of a management structure, an
individual in a supervisory position must not "be a mere bystander
to the events that occurred."" 5 The supervisor is obligated to take
steps to ensure that the firm and the compliance department give
appropriate attention to any alleged misconduct and investigate
accordingly."6  The SEC has stated that the president and
compliance director of a broker-dealer firm are ultimately
responsible for ensuring that the firm's employees comply with the
relevant regulations."7 The supervisor can reduce his liability if he
reasonably delegates these duties to lower-level employees and if
he "neither knows or has reason to know that such person's
performance is deficient.""' 8  Therefore, a supervisory structure
must not only reasonably detect and prevent violations but also be
strengthened by attentive supervisors.
II. SANCTIONS ASSESSED IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
After finding a failure to supervise, the Commission or ALJ
must decide on the appropriate sanction." 9 A wide variety of
sanctions are available to the SEC, including, among others, cease-
and-desist orders, suspensions, and bars. With the large number
of sanctions available, deciding which sanction to impose is often
difficult. The Fifth Circuit has stated that the public interest must
113. Id.
114. Id. at *51. The Commission reiterated its warning that mere reliance on
branch mangers to ensure compliance, without the establishment of a supervisory
or compliance system, is insufficient. Id. Ultimately, liability will remain with the
president of the broker-dealer firm, making the president a ripe target for an
administrative proceeding and applicable sanctions. Id. at *50.
115. In re John H. Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31,554, 51 S.E.C. 93,
113 (Dec. 3, 1992).
116. See id.
117. See Sheldon, 1992 SEC LEXIS 3052, at *50.
118. Id.
119. See Steadman v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979),
affd, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (1990); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-3, 78o (1990).
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dictate the severity of the sanction."' The court also set forth
factors that the Commission or AU should use in deciding what
sanctions are in the public interest. 2 The factors are: (1) the
egregiousness of the defendant's actions; (2) the likelihood that the
defendant's occupation will present opportunities for future
violations; and (3) the degree of scienter involved.'"
The Remedies Act of 1990 added Section 8A to the Securities
Act of 1933 and Section 21C to the 1934 Act, which granted the
power to issue cease-and-desist orders to the SEC. 4 A cease-and-
desist order ("order") is the administrative equivalent of an
injunction . 5 The Commission can order an individual to cease and
desist from violating the securities laws after finding that the
person violated, or caused a violation of, the securities
regulations.2 6  A compliance director's breach of his duty to
supervise is sufficient for the SEC to issue an order."
Furthermore, the Commission recently settled a long-standing
controversy concerning the proof required to impose an order.'28
In In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, the Commission held that a
propensity to commit a future violation is necessary to issue an
order, but simultaneously held that a past violation is normally
sufficient to establish this element.29 Thus, the mere finding of a
past violation can lead to the imposition of an order.'3 ° The SEC
may issue an order irrespective of whether there exists additional
evidence that the director is likely to violate the securities laws in
the future.' This increase in the power of the Commission
extends the potential sanction of a cease-and-desist order to a
121. Steadman, 603 F.2d 1126.
122. Id. at 1140.
123. Id.
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (1990); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1990).
125. See KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT
MANUAL, TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 137 (Richard M. Phillips ed., American Bar
Assoc. 1997) [hereinafter KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART].
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (1990); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1990).
127. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (1990); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1990).
128. In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 2001
WL 47245 (Jan. 19, 2001).
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. Id.
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compliance officer who has only once violated the securities laws
by failing to supervise his employees adequately.
3 1
A compliance director can also be suspended or barred from
the industry.13   A bar is usually reserved for more serious,
egregious violations, while suspensions are used in cases that are
more benign.14  In fact, a bar may be the most severe
administrative sanction available to the SEC.'35 The institution of a
bar or suspension against a broker/dealer or associated entity has
severe consequences, often forcing the individual to completely
withdraw from the securities industry.136 In many instances, the
SEC feels this severe sanction is justified by the circumstances
under investigation.13 1 Most of the aforementioned cases resulted
in the imposition of a bar or lengthy suspension after finding the
compliance director or broker guilty of failing to supervise.38
III. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ATTORNEYS AND
ACCOUNTANTS SERVING AS COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL
Despite the powerful nature of the above sanctions, attorneys
and accountants who serve as compliance directors face additional
sanctions. The placement of these professionals in compliance
directorships raises particular concerns that may not arise for other
compliance personnel. Attorneys and accountants are bound by
special ethical and professional duties."9  Violation of these
132. Id.
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1994).
134. See KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, supra note 125, at 158.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See In re Donald T. Sheldon, Exchange Act Release No. 31,475, 1992
SEC LEXIS 3052 (Nov. 18, 1992); In re Albert Vincent O'Neal, Exchange Act
Release No. 34,116, 56 S.E.C. Docket 2093, at *6 (May 26, 1994); In re Gary W.
Chambers, Exchange Act Release No. 27,963, 46 S.E.C. Docket 183 (Apr. 30,
1990).
138. See Sheldon, 1992 SEC LEXIS 3052 (imposing an unqualified bar on
Donald Sheldon); O'Neal, 56 S.E.C. Docket 2093, at *6 (finding a one year
suspension with a lifetime bar from supervisory positions necessary to the public
interest); Chambers, 46 S.E.C. Docket 183 (barring Gary Chambers for six
months).
139. See infra Part III.B.
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professional standards can lead to sanctions by the professional
board and the SEC. Furthermore, as a collateral consequence of
wrongdoing, the SEC can bar attorneys and accountants from
practicing before it in any capacity.40
A. The Commission's Additional Powers Over Professionals
Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice provides
that the Commission may suspend, limit, or bar "an attorney,
accountant, engineer or other professional or expert" from
practicing before it in "any way.''. The rule defines "practice" as
"transacting any business before the Commission" or participating
in the drafting or filing of any statement, notification or
application. 2  A Rule 102(e) bar restricts the ability of a
professional from participating in almost any aspect of a broker-
dealer's business.
43
Despite the general unwillingness of the Commission to
impose Rule 102(e) sanctions absent a willful violation,'" the
Commission has taken a rather expansive view of the application
of this rule.45 In a recent amendment to Rule 102(e), the
Commission lessened the gravity of conduct necessary to invoke
sanctions under the rule. 46  This amendment provided that the
mere negligence of an attorney would be sufficient to impose
sanctions in some circumstances .1 47  Thus, a finding of willful
conduct may not be necessary to impose Rule 102(e) sanctions.
For accountants, one instance of negligence, if highly
unreasonable, or repeated instances of unreasonable conduct could
140. Rule 102(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2001).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The Commission's actions generally are based on the misconduct or
willful violations of the federal securities laws by the professional. See
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, supra note 125, at 173.
145. See id.
146. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(iv)(B).
147. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.15[2] (4th
ed. 2002).
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form the basis of sanctionable conduct under Rule 102(e)."8
A finding of the compliance officer's failure to supervise, with
or without scienter, could satisfy the requirement under Rule
102(e).1 4'9  The attorney or accountant would be barred from
practicing before the Commission, not just as a compliance officer,
but in any role. 5 ' Furthermore, despite the SEC's reluctance to
bring a proceeding under Rule 102(e) absent a finding that the
professional has violated the securities laws,"' the SEC has
consistently indicated that it has the authority to adopt a general
negligence standard.'52 Thus, compliance director conduct that is
not sufficiently egregious to violate the securities laws may still
result in a Rule 102(e) ban.
B. Schism Between Ethical Duties and Representative
Responsibilities
Ethical considerations also impose constraints on the actions
of professionals, especially attorneys, and the breach of these
considerations can lead to sanctions. 153 These ethical
considerations are particularly problematic in the realm of
compliance, where the attorney may have conflicting duties.
154
Violation of the ethical considerations can lead to sanctions by the
professional board and the Commission due to the establishment
of an extremely low threshold by the Commission under Rule
102(e).'
Various states have promulgated codes of professional
conduct, including New York,'56 based on the ABA Model Rules of
148. Id.
149. The essence of a failure to supervise claim against a compliance director
is the compliance director's negligent performance of his duties. See 15 U.S.C. §
78o (1990). Therefore, the negligent nature of the compliance director's inaction
may be sufficient to impose a sanction under § 102(e).
150. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
151. See Michael J. Connell, SEC Sanctions of Securities Counsel, 1286
PLI/CORP 685 (2002).
152. See id. at 713. But see Johnson & Albert, supra note 54.
153. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R, & REGS. tit 22, §§ 1200-1210.1 (2001).
154. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
155. See Johnson & Albert, supra note 54, at 579.
156. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 22, §§ 1200-1210.1 (2001)
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Professional Conduct ("Model Rules").'57 The American Bar
Association published the Model Rules to set forth principles of
ethical and professional conduct. "8 Deviation from these rules by
an attorney can lead to sanctions from the state, including
suspension and disbarment. 159 These rules, however, do not only
affect the attorney in the state of enactment but can also affect him
before the Commission under Rule 102(e). 6 °
Rule 102(e) allows the suspension or bar of an attorney from
practicing before the Commission.' An Associate Director of
Enforcement for the SEC has remarked that professional
misconduct, presumably arising from violations of the professional
code, can invoke Rule 102(e).'62 The Commission has reaffirmed
that a lawyer's failure to act professionally can lead to the
suspension of activities before the Commission.
Ordinarily, such a mandate of professionalism is positive. It
would reaffirm the need for attorneys to adhere to the duties of
professionalism in all respects, 4 both before the Commission and
in its activities with clients. However, compliance directors and
officers serve a particular function within a brokerage firm.165 The
compliance director must investigate the firm's supervisory systems
and the firm's employees and create reports and analyses regarding
the adequacy of the systems.'66 The peculiarities of this position
157. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2001).
158. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (Foundation Press 7th ed. 2000). References to codes of
professional conduct will cite to the Model Rules and the New York Code of
Professional Responsibility.
159. See id.
160. See infra notes 161-63.
161. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2001).
162. See W. Loeber Landau, Legal Opinions Rendered in Securities
Transactions, 9 INST. SEC. REG. 3, 37 (1977) (citing the remarks of Theodore
Sonde).
163. See In re William R. Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 47 S.E.C.
471 (Feb. 28, 1981).
164. Jessica Taylor O'Mary, When Business Decisions of a Client Create a
Current Client Conflict of Interest: Implications in a Complex Ethical
Landscape, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1203 (2002).
165. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
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may sometimes be at odds with the rules of professionalism and
other duties imposed on compliance directors by the SEC. 67
Primary among an attorney's ethical duties is the duty of
confidentiality as enumerated in Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules. 168
Model Rule 1.6 requires an attorney to maintain the confidentiality
of information obtained in the representation of the client.
169
Exceptions to this rule are very few.' 7 An attorney may disclose
confidential information if the client impliedly authorizes the
attorney to reveal the information.' 7' In addition, the attorney may
reveal information to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the attorney "believes is likely to result in imminent death
or substantial bodily harm."'72  However, a compliance director
who is an attorney is unlikely to encounter instances of bodily
harm in the corporate context; most harm will be financial, which is
not a covered exception to the duty of confidentiality.
13
The discovery of illegal conduct may require an attorney who
is employed as a compliance director to notify outside individuals,
sometimes to the detriment of the client.174 Model Rule 1.13 deals
167. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
168. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6 (2001); see also N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit 22, § 1200.19 (2001) (containing substantially similar
requirements as Model Rule 1.6).
169. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT 1.6 (2001).
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. See Jenny B. Davis, The Enron Factor: Experts Say the Energy Giant's
Collapse Could Trigger Changes in the Law That Make It Easier to Snare
Professionals, 88 A.B.A. J. 40, 45 (2002).
174. See Martha Neil, SEC Posts Attorney Disclosure Rules, A.B.A. J. E
REPORT (Nov. 8, 2002). Pursuant to the recently passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
SEC has drafted attorney conduct rules. Id. The draft rules would require
corporate attorneys to report "up the ladder" and disaffirm any submission to the
SEC that the lawyer believes is tainted. Id. Anastasia D. Kelly, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel of Sears, Roebuck & Co., stated that this could
potentially lead to a "'very difficult and strained relationship."' Id. A proposed
rule requiring reporting to the SEC if the corporate directors are unwilling to
address the infractions has been tabled for now. Jenny B. Davis, SEC Releases
Final Attorney Conduct Rule, But Extends Comment Period on Noisy
Withdrawal, A.B.A. J. E REPORT (Jan. 31, 2003).
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with attorneys who are employed by an organization.' The rule
addresses instances where an employee of an organization, in this
instance, a trader or associate of the brokerage firm, "intends to
act" in a manner that violates a law and where the violation would
be imputed to the organization.'76 If this act or failure to act is
likely to result in substantial harm to the organization, the lawyer is
dutybound to respond.' The rule requires the attorney to consider
the seriousness of the violation and the responsibility of the
organization. '78 Then, depending on the seriousness of the matter
and the receptiveness of the organization's hierarchy, the attorney
must appeal to the executives of the company or resign if the
executives insist on illegal action or inaction. '
Despite the attempt by compliance directors to abide by their
professional responsibilities and advise their client of the
appropriate actions,' the organization may not be receptive to the
changes. The executives may feel differently than the attorney or
selectively ignore the transgressions of a valuable employee."' The
need to have the executives act is especially important where the
attorney has few powers over employees. 2 In such a situation,
where the executives refuse to act, the compliance director may be
forced to resign from the organization or report the situation to the
175. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr 1.13 (2001).
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. The Model Rules also require competent and diligent representation. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr 1.1 and 1.3 (2001); see also 22 N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit 22, 1200.31 (2001) (requiring an attorney to zealously
represent a client). For a compliance officer who is employed by a brokerage
firm, these professional mandates would likely translate into a duty to investigate
and discover failures within the supervisory structure and employees who have
violated the securities laws. Through fulfilling their duty to investigate diligently,
attorneys may place themselves at odds with other professional rules and duties
of their position within the firm. See supra note 139.
181. See In re Albert Vincent O'Neal, Exchange Act Release No. 34,116, 56
S.E.C. Docket 2093, *6 (May 26, 1994) (noting that O'Neal overlooked the
transgressions of Mr. Johnson because he was a "big producer").
182. See In re William R. Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 47 S.E.C.
471 (Feb. 28, 1981).
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Securities and Exchange Commission.'83
This schism between the requirement placed on attorneys by
the SEC and those placed on attorneys by the Model Rules is
disconcerting. An attorney who acts as a compliance director is
being pulled in two directions at once. Moreover, reports
generated by the compliance director on how to prevent future
wrongdoing may be discoverable in litigation." In Spectrum
Systems, the New York Court of Appeals noted that the attorney-
client privilege does not apply to a report focusing on business
recommendations. 185 It has been argued that a report on how to
prevent future violations is a business consideration and not
subject to the privilege.'86
Furthermore, even where the Model Rules are silent, morality
may cause the attorney to report the violations to protect investors,
who will likely be harmed by the violations of the securities laws by
employees of the firm. The compliance director's conscience may
compel him to warn investors. However, the Commission may
view such acts as unprofessional because the compliance director
may have breached the duty of confidentiality by disclosing matters
to the public. Such a violation may lead to sanctions for the
compliance director under Rule 102(e). The compliance director
may effectively be barred from practicing before the Commission
because of the compliance director's moral code.
The often-conflicting duties or desires of the compliance
director make compliance work difficult beyond the mere
mandates of the securities laws. The compliance director's duties
to the firm may sometimes be at odds with the attorney or
accountant professional codes. Moreover, a professional's sense of
righteousness may lead the professional to disavow the formal
codes and breach the duty of confidentiality to the firm to inform
183. See id. The SEC has indicated that an attorney's failure to inform the
SEC and prevent a securities fraud puts the attorney in breach of his or her
professional duty. Id; see also In re John H. Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release
No. 31,554, 51 S.E.C. 93, 114 (Dec. 3, 1992) (noting that disclosure to regulatory
authorities may be required).
184. See Spectrum Systems Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 78 N.Y.2d, 371
(1991).
185. Id. at 379-80.
186. See HAZEN, supra note 147, § 7.15.
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the public. In sum, the conflicting allegiances of the compliance
officer could have severe repercussions, in both the professional
and moral worlds.
IV. DISTILLING AN ADEQUATE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM TO AVOID
COMPLIANCE DIRECTOR AND CORPORATE LIABILITY
As seen above, there is tremendous liability associated with a
failure to supervise claim.' The Commission can bar an individual
or a firm from the industry and prohibit an individual from
practicing before the Commission"'. As stated by Paul F. Royce,
director of the SEC Division of Investment Management, "the
price of compliance is minimal compared to the potential costs of
non-compliance."'89 The seriousness of these consequences has put
a great deal of pressure on firms and compliance directors to create
sufficient supervisory structures and procedures. This Part
attempts to create an adequate supervisory model to reduce the
liability of the firm and its compliance director.
Unfortunately, the adequacy of a supervisory structure is
subjective. 9°  The SEC focuses on particular violations of
subordinates and thereafter determines whether the supervisory
structure was reasonably designed to detect those violations.'91
These subjective considerations of the SEC seem to effectively
cause any model to lack absolute applicability. Therefore, there
can be no formulaic pronouncement of sufficient procedural or
structural integrity.
However, a model helps focus the compliance director's
attention when creating a compliance structure and addressing
more commonplace areas of liability. It can illuminate procedures
and structures that can be manipulated by the firm to satisfy the
Commission's requirements listed above. In general, there exist
187. See supra Part II.
188. See supra Part I.
189. Paul F. Roye, Remarks Before the Investment Counsel Association of
America (Apr. 23, 1999), in Speech by SEC Staff: Meeting the Compliance
Challenge, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch271.htm (last
visited Dec. 12, 2002).
190. See supra Part I.
191. See supra Part I.
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three areas that an adequate supervisory system must address: 1)
placement of responsibility for compliance; 2) implementation of
policies and procedures; and 3) informing and auditing of
employees. These areas and the appropriate considerations are
discussed in the following sections.
A. Structural Considerations for a Compliance Model
A firm must implement an infrastructure regarding
compliance. 92 The establishment of a compliance department and
the ascension of an individual to the head of the department help
satisfy the first area of consideration.1 93 The compliance director
generally assumes much of the responsibility for ensuring the
employees' compliance with the securities regulations.1 94 However,
the ability to investigate a problematic situation and correct it
bears greatly on the power, responsibility, and liability of the
compliance director.195 A compliance director in name only does
not prevent liability from attaching to the executives of the
company. '96 A compliance director and supervisor must also
192. Lori Richards, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks at "Meet the Regulators"
(Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.sec.govlnews/speech/spch545.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2003).
193. Id.
194. See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director's Liability in the Post
Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 137, 144 (2001).
195. See In re Louis R. Trujillo, Exchange Act Release No. 26,635, 1989 SEC
LEXIS 480, at *4 (Mar. 16, 1989) (stating that Trujillo did not have adequate
power to affect the violator and, therefore, was not liable for failing to supervise).
196. It seems that a self-interested compliance director would want a
diminished ability to control the actions of others to avoid liability. The
managers, on the other hand, would want a powerful compliance director to
serve as a lightening rod for the firm. Despite this seeming incongruity, granting
the compliance director power benefits both management and the compliance
director. A powerful compliance director would have the power to investigate
and isolate violations, thereby preventing a proceeding. Moreover, the
evaluation of the compliance director's ability to affect his subordinated comes
only after the SEC has filed an enforcement action. Therefore, the mere
avoidance of placing power in the compliance director does not prevent
investigations and enforcement actions by the SEC. See Trujillo, 1989 SEC
LEXIS 480 (investigating Trujillo before the Commission decided that he lacked
adequate power to be viewed as a supervisor).
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adequately investigate "red flags" or allegations of irregularity.'9
Supervisors cannot satisfy their duty to supervise by merely relying
on the statements of employees9
Once power has been instilled in the compliance director, the
rest of the hierarchical structure must be in place. As mentioned in
Sheldon, mere reliance on branch managers is insufficient.'9 This
insufficiency is particularly acute when broker-dealers rely on a
network of small, remote offices.'l Managers can be useful
resources, closer to the action than the often further-removed
compliance director. However, a more structured hierarchy is
necessary to establish a sufficient infrastructure. A regional
director can examine the workings of the individual offices and the
performance of the managers. 2' Compliance personnel, including
the compliance director, can analyze rumblings of wrongdoing.
The line of examination and review must extend through the
compliance director to the heights of the broker-dealer firm. The
principal is ultimately responsible for the compliance of his
employees. 2
Thus, an effective supervisory system will often have multiple
layers of employees and supervisors. However, the existence of
multiple supervisors requires the delineation of clear lines of
responsibility and duty. 3 The structure must clearly define the
197. See In re John H. Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31,554, 51 S.E.C.
93, 108 (Dec. 3, 1992) (stating that supervisors "cannot discharge their
supervisory obligations simply by relying on the unverified representations of
employees").
198. Id.
199. See In re Donald T. Sheldon, Exchange Act Release No. 31,475, 1992
SEC LEXIS 3052 (Nov. 18, 1992).
200. See Richard D. Marshall, Trends in SEC Enforcement and Inspections of
Investment Advisers, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS (2001).
201. Lori Richards, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks at "Meet the Regulators"
(Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch545.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2003).
202. See Gutfreund, 51 S.E.C. at 111 (noting that the chief executive officer
has the "ultimate affirmative responsibility ... to ensure that steps are taken to
prevent future violations of the securities laws and to determine the scope of
wrongdoing"); see also Sheldon, 1992 SEC LEXIS 3052, at *50.
203. See HAZEN, supra note 147, § 14.26[6] [C].
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roles of each supervisor in the investigation of wrongdoing. "
Additionally, a lower-level supervisor must continue to monitor
the situation and address the problem until the supervisor's
superior takes control.0"
B. The Establishment of Policies and Procedures
Compliance programs cannot merely rely on the establishment
of a hierarchical structure. The firm must also create seminars and
written compliance directives.2 The establishment of written
policies and procedures help add legitimacy to a compliance system
in the eyes of others. 7 The use of procedures gives the compliance
system a sense of congruency and completeness that would not
otherwise exist.208  Through the establishment of written
procedures, the firm can clearly and unequivocally state its policy
of compliance.2 9
In addition, the establishment of concrete procedures creates
an atmosphere of compliance and access to information within the
firm.210 The employees can refer to these policies when they
encounter questionable situations or witness others making ill-
informed decisions. The policies should also inform the employees
of the organizational aspects of the compliance structure. The
employee will then know of the layers of compliance personnel,
leaving the employee aware that the system is complete. The use
of the structure by the middle management and supervisors helps
reinforce the importance of compliance with the regulations.
204. See Gutfreund, 51 S.E.C. at 108 (stating that "if more than one supervisor
is involved in considering the actions taken in response to misconduct, there must
be a clear definition of the efforts taken and a clear assignment of those
responsibilities to specific individuals within the firm.").
205. See HAZEN, supra note 147, § 14.26[6][C].
206. See Brown, supra note 194, at 119.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 132.
209. See id.
210. See id.
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C. Informing and Auditing the Employees
Education programs should also be implemented. They show
the dedication of a compliance director, and the firm as a whole, to
complying with the securities laws."' To be effective, the programs
must be regular and targeted toward all employees in decision-
making positions. The programs should inform employees of the
written internal policies and the relevant securities laws and
regulations applying to both brokerage firms generally and to
broker-dealers and their associates specifically. The maintenance
of a hotline that employees and clients can use to confidentially
discuss possible illegal conduct may illustrate a coherent structure
to the SEC.
Moreover, the use of audits and investigations are an integral
part of an effective compliance program."2  After receiving
information of illegal conduct, the compliance director or
personnel must investigate the allegations and address the
problems."3 Reliance on the alleged violator's assertions that the
actions complied with the securities laws is insufficient."4 The
supervisor must investigate whether the illegal conduct actually
occurred, the extent of the violations, and the culpability of the
employee.
Even in the absence of known or alleged violations,
investigations and audits of client accounts and trades should be
conducted. 5 They can help locate, and even prevent, violations of
the securities laws.216 These spontaneous investigations assist in the
identification of problem areas and, therefore, the reduction of
these by helping identify problem areas before violations occur.
217
211. Id.
212 See HAZEN, supra note 147, § 14.26[6][C].
213. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
215. See Lori Richards, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks at "Meet the
Regulators" (Mar. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch545.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003);
Lawrence J. Zweifach, Internal Corporate Investigations, 509 PLI/LIT 431 (1994).
216. See Zweifach, supra note 215.
217. See Brown, supra note 207, at *128.
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CONCLUSION
Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission have
imposed enormous duties on brokerage firms and compliance
directors.21' Arguably, these duties and regulations help protect
clients who entrust their money to broker-dealers and the broker-
dealer's associates. However, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has not sufficiently elaborated on the means by which
compliance directors can comply with their duties and avoid
liability. Only a fragmentary approach can be distilled from the
Commission's enforcement proceedings.
However, much can be learned from the accumulated
proceedings. The compliance director must establish adequate
internal procedures and policies to reasonably investigate, rectify,
and prevent securities law violations."9 An investigation by the
SEC will revolve around the reasonableness of the structure, and
the compliance director's role within that structure, in identifying
and preventing the securities violation at issue. The SEC is likely
to constantly scrutinize the structure and the acts of the compliance
director, especially in the current atmosphere of distrust.
The current attention from investors and the SEC makes it
necessary for a brokerage firm and compliance director to analyze
their current supervisory structure and system and make
appropriate changes. However, this role becomes increasingly
difficult by the inclusion of subjective considerations, such as the
size of the firm and the amount of power given to the compliance
director. There may also exist conflicting interests between the
well-being of the firm and the clients. The ramifications of these
conflicts of interest may become more acute if the compliance
director is a professional. A firm, and its compliance director, must
exercise care and attention to navigate through the various
obstacles and exit unscathed.
218. See supra Part I.
219. See supra Part I.
220. See supra Parts I.A-B.
